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STATE V. PRINCE: A STANDARD OF APPLICATION OR AN 
EVIDENTIARY TRUMP CARD? 
INTRODUCTION 
“Prosecuting sex crimes is a sensitive and challenging process, and most 
people who perpetrate these crimes go unpunished.”1 Federal and State Rules of 
Evidence have evolved to address this challenge by incorporating special rules 
concerning the use of propensity evidence. Propensity evidence is a type of 
character evidence which relies on presenting evidence of the defendant’s prior 
criminal actions for the specific purpose of showing the defendant has the 
likelihood to commit similar crimes.2 Generally speaking, due to the prejudicial 
nature of propensity evidence, submission of prior criminal acts is inadmissible 
at trial to demonstrate propensity;3 however, in response to the extremely 
serious, personal, and damaging nature of sex crimes, in conjunction with the 
difficulty of their prosecution, the federal government and several states have 
created exceptions to this general rule.4 All of these states and the federal 
government have crafted these evidentiary exceptions to deal specifically with 
sex offenses. Some of these statutes and rules of evidence are even narrower, 
 
 1. Michael L. Smith, Prior Sexual Misconduct Evidence in State Courts: Constitutional and 
Common Law Challenges. 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 321, 322 (2015). See also, Karen M. Fingar, And 
Justice For All: The Admissibility of Uncharged Sexual Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 501, 501-04 
(1996). 
 2. Scott H. Greenfield, What’s Wrong with Propensity Evidence Anyway?, SIMPLE JUSTICE: 
A CRIMINAL DEFENSE BLOG (Oct. 14, 2008), https://blog.simplejustice.us/2008/10/14/whats-
wrong-with-propensity-evidence-anyway/ [https://perma.cc/EU8L-WC2F]. 
 3. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, Ch. 17, § 186 (7th ed. 2013) 
(“Exclusion is therefore much more likely when the character evidence is offered solely to help 
prove that a person acted in one way or another.”). 
 4. FED. R. EVID. 413; MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(c); ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b); ARIZ. R. EVID. 
404(c); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108(a); CONN. CODE EVID. 4-5(b); FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b) (West 
2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-414(a) (West 2019); KAN. STAT. ANN § 60-455(d) (West 2019); 
LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 412.2(a); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.27(a) (West 2019); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 27-414(1) (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2413(a) (West 2019); UTAH R. EVID. 
404(c); People v. Falsetta, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 852 (Cal. 1999); People v. Fitch, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 
753, 759 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Report to the Attorney General on the Admission of Criminal 
Histories at Trial, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 707, 723–27 (1989). “In the wake of the 1994 
enactment of Rules 413 and 414, several states have passed legislation permitting the introduction 
of prior sexual assault or child molestation.” Smith, supra note 1, at 323. 
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encompassing only child sex crimes.5 Missouri is one of a handful of states that 
have crafted exceptions to the general rule against prior acts evidence,6 passing 
by referendum a constitutional amendment allowing such evidence in the realm 
of child sex crimes.7 Under the new standard, evidence of prior criminal acts is 
admissible to demonstrate propensity and “[a] court may exclude relevant 
evidence of prior criminal acts if the probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”8 After a handful of 
appeals citing multiple issues with the new section’s application, the Missouri 
Supreme Court weighed in. The question is: Did it lay down a standard, or did 
it create an evidentiary trump card? 
This note presents a critical review of the Missouri Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in State v. Prince concerning the admission of propensity evidence 
under a provision of the Missouri Constitution Article I, section 18(c) (“the 
Section”). Part I of this note details the state of the law concerning propensity 
evidence as it currently stands. Subpart A to Part I briefly details how Missouri 
courts have traditionally treated propensity evidence. It then lays out how 
Missouri courts have applied the Section since it became effective, and what 
appellate challenges have arisen under its application. Subpart B to Part I begins 
by briefly detailing the history of propensity evidence in other jurisdictions. 
Subpart B then details the initial test for relevancy and admissibility under 
propensity evidence standards. It discusses the current trend of application (or 
standard of admissibility) in Missouri and in other jurisdictions. After discussing 
the state of the law, Parts II and III lay out the facts, procedural posture, and 
eventual holding of the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Prince. In addition, 
Part III presents a detailed account of the Missouri Supreme Court’s analysis 
and rationale in deciding this case. Part IV presents a critical analysis of what 
the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Prince represents, as well as any 
anticipated issues or repercussions dealing with the nature of having 
constitutional evidentiary standards, the lack of addressing the prejudicial effect 
of this type of evidence, and the actual factors of the test laid down in this case.  
 
 5. MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(c); FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b) (West 2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-
4-414(a) (West 2019); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 412.2(a) (West 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
768.27(a) (West 2019); UTAH R. EVID. 404(c). 
 6. Smith, supra note 1, at 323–24 (listing Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida,  
Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah,  
and Washington as states with legislation permitting evidence of prior acts in prosecutions for sex 
crimes). 
 7. MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(c); Claire Boston et al., Two Ballot Measures Pass Statewide, and 
Two Are Defeated (Nov. 9, 2014), https://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/state_news/two-
ballot-measures-pass-statewide-and-two-are-defeated/article_ed213198-bed1-5a2a-b50c-d43916 
119494.html [https://perma.cc/7V3G-LN5V]. 
 8. MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(c). 
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I.  STATE OF THE LAW 
A. Missouri Courts 
Missouri has historically banned the use of prior acts evidence for the 
purpose of proving a criminal defendant’s propensity to commit crimes with 
which he or she is charged.9 Twice, by statute, the Missouri Legislature has 
attempted to allow propensity evidence for the purpose of prosecuting child sex 
offenders.10 Both times, these statutes have been struck down as 
unconstitutional.11 In 2014, Missourians amended the state constitution to allow 
propensity evidence in prosecutions for crimes of a sexual nature with a victim 
under the age of eighteen years old.12 The Section has been applied in a number 
of cases, including State v. Prince, discussed below in Parts II–IV.13 Its 
application has been appealed on several distinct grounds. 
The first issue with application seen on appeal was the question of 
applicability or inapplicability on the basis of when the alleged crime occurred.14 
In the cases of State ex rel Tipler v. Gardner and State v. Jones, application of 
the subsection was challenged on the ground that its application was 
retrospective because the crimes with which the defendants were charged 
occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment.15 The defendants argued 
that application to their cases was barred under the ex post facto clauses of the 
Missouri and United States Constitutions.16 In State ex rel Tipler, the Missouri 
Supreme Court held that Art. I, § 18(c) was a procedural evidentiary standard, 
and as such was applicable because it did not purport to alter or change the 
 
 9. State v. Burns, 978 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Mo. banc 1998) (citing State v. Holbert, 416 S.W.2d 
129, 132 (Mo. 1967)). 
 10. William E. Marcantel, Protecting the Predator or the Prey? The Missouri Supreme 
Court’s Refusal to Allow Past Sexual Misconduct as Propensity Evidence. 74 MO. L.REV. 211, 212 
(2009). 
 11. Id. 
 12. MO. CONST. Art. I, § 18(c). 
  Notwithstanding the provisions of section 17 and 18(a) of this article to the contrary, 
in prosecutions for crimes of a sexual nature involving a victim under eighteen years of age, 
relevant evidence of prior criminal acts, whether charged or uncharged, is admissible for 
the purpose of corroborating the victim’s testimony or demonstrating the defendant’s 
propensity to commit the crime with which he or she is presently charged. The court may 
exclude relevant evidence of prior criminal acts if the probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Id. 
 13. See State v. Prince, 534 S.W.3d 813, 819 (Mo. 2017) (en banc); State ex rel Tipler v. 
Gardner, 506 S.W.3d 922, 924 (Mo. 2017); State v. Jones, 546 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017); 
State v. Hood, 521 S.W.3d 680, 683 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017); State v. Rucker, 512 S.W.3d 63 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2017). 
 14. Tipler, 506 S.W.3d at 924; Jones, 546 S.W.3d at 3–5. 
 15. Tipler, 506 S.W.3d at 924; Jones, 546 S.W.3d at 3–5. 
 16. Tipler, 506 S.W.3d at 925. 
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crimes with which the defendant was charged.17 The court in State v. Jones, 
decided after Tipler, applied the Tipler analysis to the same end.18 
The next line of cases challenging the Section’s application focused on the 
prejudicial effect of admitting propensity evidence. In State v. Rucker the 
defendant appealed the trial court’s failure to take into account the prejudicial 
effect of the evidence submitted under the Section.19 The Missouri Court of 
Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri rejected this argument, stating that 
the statutory language of the Section grants the trial courts significant discretion 
in the admission or exclusion of evidence under the Section.20 In State v. Jones, 
the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to apply a balancing 
test as was required under the Section.21 The court rejected this argument, stating 
that the Section did not have an inherent balancing test.22 
The final issue Missouri courts have addressed on appeal is the admissibility 
of testimony presented under the Section about actions occurring while the 
defendant was a juvenile. In State v. Hood, the trial court allowed testimony of 
family members about the actions of the defendant while he was a juvenile.23 
This testimony was in turn used to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to 
commit statutory rape and sodomy.24 On appeal, the defendant argued that this 
testimony was inadmissible because the actions to which various family 
members testified occurred while he was a juvenile.25 The Missouri Court of 
Appeals for the Southern District of Missouri rejected this argument, stating that 
the testimony was admissible because it neither referenced nor relied on juvenile 
records or adjudications.26 
In summary, prior to the Missouri Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. 
Prince, Missouri Courts had struggled with applying the Section, allowing for 
liberal admission of propensity evidence without being able to lay down or even 
articulate a cognizable standard on which to base admissibility. Moreover, the 
appellate courts addressed prejudice at a bare minimum, electing only to say that 
courts have discretion; balancing tests are optional. In addition to little definitive 
caselaw on the subject, the language of the Section provides little guidance from 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Jones, 546 S.W.3d at 5. 
 19. State v. Rucker, 512 S.W.3d 63, 67–69 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). 
 20. Id. at 69. “The General Assembly’s use of the word ‘may’ indicates that the court has 
discretion to exclude such evidence in these circumstances, but it is not obligated to do so.” Id. 
(citing Wolf v. Midwest Nephrology Consultants, PC., 487 S.W.3d 78, 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016)). 
“Accordingly, even if the evidence’s probative value was ‘substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice,’ the trial court was not required to exclude the evidence.” Id. 
 21. Jones, 546 S.W.3d at 3. 
 22. Id. at 5. 
 23. 521 S.W.3d 680, 685–86 (Mo. Ct. App 2017). 
 24. Id. at 688. 
 25. Id. at 683. 
 26. Id. at 687. 
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which trial courts can derive a clear standard of application. Thus, it seems the 
Missouri Supreme Court had little option but to address these issues and lay 
down a uniform standard for applying the Section. 
B. Other Jurisdictions 
As with Missouri, prior acts evidence has historically been banned in other 
jurisdictions due to its prejudicial nature.27 In 1994, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (the “Rules”) were amended to allow admission of prior misconduct 
evidence to be admitted at trials for crimes of a sexual nature.28 The Rules allow 
juries to consider any propensity evidence admitted for its bearing “on any 
matter to which it is relevant.”29 Following suit, states began to abandon rigid 
evidentiary standards banning prior acts evidence, opting instead to weigh the 
probative value of this type of evidence to the prejudicial effect.30 Similar to 
what has occurred in Missouri, jurisdictions allowing prior acts evidence in 
criminal prosecutions have experienced numerous appeals dealing with the 
application of these standards.31 From these appellate decisions, a general 
standard of application has emerged. 
One of the first tests for admission emerging out of federal circuit courts is 
the LeMay test, which listed five factors for consideration in determining 
relevance and weighing probative value.32 In applying these factors, courts were 
able to determine admissibility of prior acts evidence while being conscious of 
the necessary interplay between Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 414.33 Those 
factors are: similarity in conduct; remoteness in time; frequency of prior acts; 
the presence or lack of intervening circumstances; and the necessity of this 
evidence beyond the testimony and evidence already offered at trial.34 As this 
 
 27. BROUN ET AL., supra note 3, at Ch. 17, § 186. 
 28. Fingar, supra note 1, at 507–09. 
 29. Id. FED. R. EVID. 413, Similar Crimes in Sexual-Assault Cases, provides: 
(a) PERMITTED USES. In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of a sexual assault, 
the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual assault. The 
evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant. 
FED. R. EVID. 414, Similar Crimes in Child-Molestation Cases, provides: 
(a) PERMITTED USES. In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of child 
molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other child 
molestation. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant. 
 30. Fingar, supra note 1, at 510. 
 31. See generally Smith, supra note 1. 
 32. United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding the five-factor test 
handed down in Glanzer was applicable to criminal trials to determine whether evidence admitted 
under Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 is unfairly prejudicial within the meaning of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403). See also Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1268 (9th 
Cir. 2000). 
 33. LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1031. 
 34. Id. at 1028. 
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test was laid down at the intermediate appellate level, this test is not binding on 
all jurisdictions.35 Thus, many jurisdictions have utilized a similar framework; 
however, not all jurisdictions weigh factors present in this test equally and 
sometimes even eliminate certain factors altogether. 
The predominant variation of the Lemay test is a three-factor test. The 
majority of jurisdictions look at victim similarity, similarity in the crime or prior 
act, and temporal relevance.36 While similarity in victimology and crime are 
themselves essentially self-defining, temporal relevance is not. Temporal 
relevance, through case law, has been defined as a combination of two factors: 
remoteness of the prior crime or act and presence or lack of an intervening event 
between crimes, often weighted together to determine probative value.37 
 
 35. See United States v. Hawpetoss, 478 F.3d 820, 825 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating the Seventh 
Circuit has not expressly adopted the factors-based test of Lemay, instead opting to apply a more 
flexible approach centered on similarity, remoteness, and frequency). 
 36. Smithart v. State, 946 P.2d 1264, 1270 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (relying on upon similarity 
of the conduct, proximity in time to the alleged crime, and similarity in victimology to determine 
admissibility); Carpentino v. State, 38 P.3d 547, 553–54 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (specifically 
comparing victims and conduct, then looking at remoteness to determine admissibility under the 
standard); State v. Williams, 99 P.3d 43, 47–48 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (assessing remoteness and 
similarity of incidents to determine relevancy); People v. Villatoro, 281 P.3d 390, 397 (2012) 
(stating that when a defendant is charged with multiple sex offenses they may be dissimilar enough 
or too remote so as to cause exclusion); People v. Harris, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998) (looking at similarity in victimology and the proffered prior conduct to determine relevanc y 
and probative value); State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 79–80 (Conn. 2008) (determining 
admissibility on the basis of similarity in victim, conduct, and close proximity in time); Coleman 
v. State, 126 So.3d 1199, 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (determining probative value and 
prejudice by evaluating similarity of the acts and victimology, proximity or remoteness in time,  
frequency of acts, and presence of lack of intervening events); McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248, 
1262 (Fla. 2006) (assessing similarity of acts and victimology, proximity in time, frequency of acts, 
and presence or lack of intervening events to determine probative value); Eubanks v. State, 774 
S.E.2d 146, 148 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (looking at prosecutorial need, similarity between the events, 
and temporal remoteness to determine probative value); State v. Boysaw, 372 P.3d 1261, 1272 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (determining probative value and admissibility by looking to time lapse 
between offenses, frequency of acts, occurrence or lack of intervening events, similarity in conduct, 
and similarity in victims); People v. Duenaz, 854 N.W.2d 531, 542 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (looking 
at similarity in acts and victimology, temporal proximity, frequency or infrequency of conduct, and 
necessity to determine admissibility). 
 37. Smithart, 946 P.2d at 1270 (not too remote in time); Harris, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d at 696 
(“remoteness” or “staleness”); Coleman, 126 So.3d at 1202 (presence or lack of intervening 
circumstances); McLean, 934 So.2d at 1262 (closeness in time and presence or lack of intervening 
circumstances). In Carpentino, 38 P.3d at 553, the court reasoned that the remoteness and similarity 
prongs overlap: 
[T]he “remoteness” of a prior crime does not hinge simply on a chronological calculation.  
A trial judge’s determination of “remoteness” also involves a weighing of the circumstances 
surrounding the two incidents (the prior one and the charged one), an identification of the 
factors common to the two incidents, and an assessment of whether the probative value of 
these connecting factors is likely to appreciably diminish with the elapsed time. 
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Although the majority of jurisdictions have followed the three-factor test, or a 
variation thereof, for determining relevance and probative value, there are some 
outliers. In addition to the three-factor test noted above, several jurisdictions 
have also employed the necessity factor, weighing the true need for this type of 
evidence in the instant case with the potential prejudice created by the 
evidence.38 Other jurisdictions have expanded what prior acts may be admitted 
beyond those traditionally thought to be similar.39 Finally, some other 
jurisdictions require clear and convincing evidence that the prior act actually 
occurred.40 However, these outliers can be explained by the language 
specifically used in the applicable statutes or rules of evidence.41 
In addition to the relevancy factors test, all of the other jurisdictions have 
one thing in common. They all allow relevant prior acts evidence where the 
probative value of the proffered evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.42 This 
 
Id. 
 38. See Lemay, 260 F3d. at 1027–28. 
 39. State v. Snelgrove, 954 A.2d 165, 177 (Conn. 2008) (holding that prior acts not necessarily 
sexual in nature may be admissible for propensity purposes so long as they were motivated by the 
defendant’s aberrant sexual compulsion). 
 40. State v. James, 393 P.3d 467, 472 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). 
 41. ARIZ. R. EVID. 404(c), Character Evidence in Sexual Misconduct Cases, provides: 
(1) In all such cases, the court shall admit evidence of the other act only if it first finds each 
of the following: 
(A) The evidence is sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find that the defendant 
committed the other act. 
CONN. CODE EVID. 4-5(b), When Evidence of Other Sexual Misconduct Is Admissible to Prove 
Propensity, provides: 
(b) When evidence of other sexual misconduct is admissible to prove propensity. Evidenc e 
of other sexual misconduct is admissible in a criminal case to establish that the defendant 
had a tendency or a propensity to engage in aberrant and compulsive sexual misconduct if: 
(1) the case involves aberrant and compulsive sexual misconduct; (2) the trial court finds 
that the evidence is relevant to a charged offense in that the other sexual misconduct is not 
too remote in time, was allegedly committed upon a person similar to the alleged victim,  
and was otherwise similar in nature and circumstances to the aberrant and compulsive 
misconduct at issue in the case; and (3) the trial court finds that the probative value of the 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. 
NEB. REV. ST. § 27-414 (West 2019), Criminal Use; Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault 
Cases, provides: 
(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is accused of an offense of sexual assault, 
evidence of the accused’s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is 
admissible if there is clear and convincing evidence . . . that the accused committed the 
other offense or offenses. 
 42. FED. R. EVID. 413; ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(ii); ARIZ. R. EVID. 404(c)(1)(C); CAL. 
EVID. CODE § 1108(a); CONN. CODE EVID. 4-5(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2)(b) (West 2019); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-414(a) (West 2019); KAN. STAT. ANN 60-455(d) (West 2019); LA. CODE 
EVID. ANN. ART. 412.2(a); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.27 (West 2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 27-414(3) (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT.12 § 2413 (a) (West 2019); UTAH R. EVID. 404(c). 
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requirement serves as a check on admission which stems from each 
jurisdiction’s various rules of evidence. 
In summary, other jurisdictions, similar to Missouri, have struggled with 
appellate challenges to the application of evidentiary standards for allowing 
admission of propensity evidence. Through a myriad of case law and appeals, 
other jurisdictions have seemingly settled on a three-factor test weighing 
temporal relevance, victim similarity, and similarity in prior conduct to 
determine relevancy and probative value. Once the proffered evidence is 
determined relevant, the courts require that the proffered evidence’s prejudicial 
effect does not outweigh its probative value. 
II.  FACTS AND LOWER COURT HOLDINGS 
A. Case Facts 
In State v. Prince, the victim was a four-month-old child. On December 2, 
2012, the victim and her mother spent the night at Prince’s home.43 The 
following morning, Prince “discovered” the victim face down and unresponsive 
on the living room couch.44 The victim was taken to a nearby hospital and then 
air-lifted to a regional children’s hospital, at which she was placed in the 
pediatric intensive care unit.45 The victim died at the hospital.46 It was 
determined that the cause of the victim’s death was strangulation; however, the 
victim suffered multiple injuries from which she would have died had she not 
been strangled.47 The victim was sexually assaulted anally, resulting in 
numerous internal tears.48 The victim had multiple bruises to her body, face, 
chest, and legs, as well as a cranial laceration, all of which indicated she was 
subjected to severe trauma prior to her strangulation.49 Prince was arrested and 
charged with first-degree murder, felony abuse of a child, and forcible sodomy.50  
B. Trial Court Proceedings 
Between the commission of Prince’s crimes and the date of his eventual jury 
trial, the Missouri Constitution was amended to allow the admission of relevant 
evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts or criminal conduct at trial for 
prosecution of crimes of a sexual nature perpetrated against someone under the 
 
 43. State v. Prince, 534 S.W.3d 813, 816 (Mo. 2017) (en banc). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 817. 
 48. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 816–17. 
 49. State v. Prince, No. ED 102938, 2017 WL 2644431, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. June 20, 2017), 
transferred to Mo. S.Ct., 534 S.W.3d 813 (Mo. banc 2017). 
 50. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 817. 
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age of eighteen.51 The amended section allows the admission of evidence for the 
purpose of demonstrating a defendant’s propensity to commit the crimes with 
which he or she is charged.52 As a result, the prosecution sought to enter 
evidence of prior bad acts contained within Prince’s juvenile record for the 
purpose of demonstrating his propensity to commit the types of crimes with 
which he was charged.53 
At trial, and over Prince’s objection, the prosecution submitted evidence of 
Prince’s cell phone internet search history and text messaging records, as well 
as evidence of Prince’s Idaho juvenile record with regard to an adjudication of 
delinquency for “lewd and lascivious” conduct with a minor.54 The prosecution 
did so through the testimony of the interrogating officer in his juvenile case.55 
While testifying, the interrogating officer read substantial portions of Prince’s 
juvenile record to the jury.56 These portions included the allegation itself, the 
criminal statute defining the acts as a felony, and the certified adjudication which 
included Prince’s admission that he committed the alleged acts.57 At the 
conclusion of evidence, the court instructed the jury that evidence of prior 
criminal acts could be considered for the purpose of proving Prince did in fact 
have a propensity to commit crimes of a sexual nature against children.58 In 
addition, during jury deliberations, the jury requested to see “the paperwork for 
the defendant’s prior crime against a child that occurred in another state.”59 The 
court provided the jury with portions of Prince’s juvenile record including the 
petition listing the factual allegations and the juvenile court’s decree indicating 
Prince’s admission to the delinquency.60 Prince was found guilty on all charges 
and sentenced to three consecutive life sentences.61 
C. Intermediate Appellate Court 
Prince appealed his conviction to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the 
Eastern District of Missouri.62 Prince raised multiple issues on appeal.63 First, 
 
 51. Prince, 2017 WL 2644431, at *1. 
 52. Id.; MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(c). 
 53. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 817. 
 54. Id. The defendant’s cell phone internet history showed that he visited pornographic  
websites and had recently researched child autopsies, while the text messages submitted were 
detailed conversations between Prince and the victim’s mother, in which sexual contact between 
the victim and Prince was discussed. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. State v. Prince, No. ED 102938, 2017 WL 2644431, at *2, (Mo. Ct. App. June 20, 2017). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at *1. 
 63. Prince, 2017 WL 2644431, at*2. 
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he argued that the trial court erred in admitting his juvenile records for the 
purposes of proving his propensity because his juvenile adjudication was neither 
logically nor legally relevant evidence64 of prior criminal acts as required by 
Article I, Section 18(c).65 Second, Prince argued that the evidentiary standard 
could not be applied in the case at bar as his juvenile conduct predated the 
enactment of the Section, thus rendering application a violation of the ex post 
facto clause of both the Missouri and United States Constitutions.66 Finally, 
Prince argued that the court erred in admitting his pornographic website use 
because it was neither logically nor legally relevant.67 
The appellate court reversed and remanded the trial court’s judgment, 
stating the court erred in admitting Prince’s juvenile records as propensity 
evidence under Article I, Section 18(c), and that Prince suffered prejudice as a 
result.68 However, the appellate court, as this was a case presenting an issue of 
first impression in Missouri and involving a question of general importance,69 
transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 83.02.70  
III.  THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT OPINION 
After accepting transfer, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized three 
points on appeal.71 Those points were: the admission of the defendant’s 
pornography use and text messages found on his phone; the admissibility of the 
defendant’s juvenile record under the standard of logical relevancy; and the 
admission of the defendant’s juvenile record under the standard of legal 
relevancy.72 The court dismissed Prince’s argument regarding the prejudicial 
effect of the admission of his text messages and use of pornography, stating that 
 
 64. Id.; “The general rule in Missouri is that relevance is two-tier: logical and Legal.” State v. 
Anderson, 76 S.W.3d 275, 276 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). “Evidence is logically relevant if it tends to 
make the existence of a material fact more or less probable.” Id. “Legal relevance weighs the 
probative value of the evidence against its cost, unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading 
the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness.” Id. (citing State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d 
308, 314 (Mo. banc 1992)). 
 65. Prince, 2017 WL 2644431, at *2; see also MO. CONST. art. I, § 18 (c) (“[C]ourt may 
exclude relevant evidence . . . if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice.”). 
 66. Prince, 2017 WL 2644431, at *2. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at *10. 
 69. Note: the appellate court made the decision to reverse the trial court’s holding based on 
the dispositive issue that Prince’s juvenile records were admitted as evidence under MO. CONST. 
Art. I, § 18(c), and an admission of such records as evidence could not occur at law because such 
records are not “lawful or proper evidence” under MO REV. STAT. § 211.271(3). The issue of first 
impression was the issue of how to resolve the seemingly present conflict between MO. CONST. 
Art. I, § 18(c) and MO. REV. STAT. § 211.271(3) (West 2019). Id. 
 70. Prince, 2017 WL 2644431, at *10. 
 71. State v. Prince, 534 S.W.3d 813, 817 (Mo. 2017) (en banc). 
 72. Id. at 821. 
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any prejudice arising from its admission “was not due to the state’s presentation 
. . . but rather from the offensive content of the material found.”73 The court 
addressed the admission of Prince’s juvenile record, stating that it was both 
logically and legally relevant under Art. I, § 18(c).74 As a result, the court 
reversed the judgment of the Eastern District, affirming the circuit court and 
upholding Prince’s convictions for first-degree murder, felony abuse of a child, 
and forcible sodomy.75 
The court began its analysis by defining relevance.76 The court stated that 
evidence is only admissible if both legally and logically relevant.77 The court’s 
definition of relevancy is as follows: “Evidence is logically relevant if it tends 
to make the existence of a material fact more or less probable.”78 “Legal 
relevance weighs the probative value of the evidence against its costs—unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of 
time, or cumulativeness.”79 Finally, the court stated that prejudice created by 
logically relevant evidence must not outweigh its probative value, otherwise the 
evidence will not be admitted.80 Setting these two relevancy standards as the 
benchmark for admission, the court looked at both the historical development of 
the law in Missouri and federal jurisdictions to define logical and legal relevancy 
within the context of admitting or excluding propensity evidence. 
In addressing logical relevance, the court started by noting logical relevance 
“is a very low-level test that is easily met.”81 The court then went on to address 
Prince’s arguments against logical relevancy—namely a lack of relevance based 
on remoteness in time, dissimilarity in action or conduct, and the fact that 
juvenile adjudications are not criminal acts.82 The court did not find Prince’s 
arguments convincing. The court stated that temporal relevance is not an issue 
of logical relevance, but rather one of legal relevance, as passage of time would 
ordinarily decrease the probative value of such evidence.83 Next, the court 
dispelled with Prince’s arguments about the dissimilarity of his criminal conduct 
by stating the mere fact that he was not related to the second victim, as he was 
with the first, was not enough to make these crimes dissimilar within the 
relevancy context.84 The court stated that the crimes were similar because of the 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 817–21. 
 75. Id. at 822. 
 76. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 817. 
 77. Id. at 818–19. 
 78. Id. (quoting State v. Collings, 450 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Mo. 2014) (en banc)). 
 79. Id. at 818 (quoting State v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529, 538 (Mo. 2002) (en banc)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 819 (quoting State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Mo. 1992) (en 
banc) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 82. Id. at 819. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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similarity in victimology—namely that both victims were young females who 
he had access to through close family-like relationships.85 Finally, the court 
addressed Prince’s argument regarding juvenile adjudications not being criminal 
acts.86 In doing so, the court stated that Prince’s prior acts, regardless of their 
classification at law, were criminal acts.87 The court relied on State v. Doss 
stating although juvenile records were generally inadmissible, they were 
indicative of one’s previous engagement in criminal behavior.88 Based on the 
foregoing, the court found the admission of the prior acts contained within his 
juvenile record to be logically relevant. 
After determining admission of the prior acts evidence logically relevant, 
the court addressed legal relevance. The court, as seen earlier, stated that 
remoteness in time was not an issue of logical relevance, but rather one of legal 
relevance as remoteness of the prior act traditionally affects probative value.89 
As the Missouri Supreme Court had not addressed the issue of legal relevance 
with regard to admission of prior criminal acts occurring years prior to the 
conduct at issue, the court looked to other jurisdictions employing similar 
evidentiary standards for guidance.90 In doing so, they found that the remoteness 
with regard to relevance is not subject to a rigid rule.91 Instead, the court found 
that it is case dependent and should be looked at together with similarity in the 
criminal conduct to determine the questions of relevance and probative value.92 
The court, having gleaned guidance from other jurisdictions, looked to similarity 
in conduct and victimology, as well as whether any intervening events could 
mitigate the remoteness in time between the adjudication and the present 
crimes.93 Here, comparing the acts for which Prince was adjudicated delinquent 
in Idaho and the crimes with which he was currently charged, the court 
determined both the victimology and conduct to be sufficiently similar.94 
Finally, the court, looking at the gap between Prince’s adjudication and the 
present case, found that a three year detention as a result of his adjudication 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 819. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (citing State v. Doss, 394 S.W.3d 486, 496–97 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 820. 
 91. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 820. (citing State v. Armstrong, 793 N.W.2d 6, 12 (S.D. 2010)). 
See also id. (citing Fisher v. State, 641 N.E.2d 105, 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)); id. (citing United 
States v. Emmert, 825 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2016) (admitting offense from up to twenty years 
prior conduct at issue)); id. (citing United States v. Lemay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1029, 1020 (9th Cir. 
2001) (finding prior conduct committed eleven years earlier when the defendant was twelve years 
old admissible)); id. (citing United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(finding prior sexual conduct thirty years earlier was not too remote)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 820–21. 
 94. Id. 
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sufficiently mitigated the fact that his prior actions and this current case were a 
number of years apart, thus rendering the admission of his prior adjudication 
legally relevant.95 
The court then went on to briefly address the issue of prejudice. In doing so, 
the court stated that the circuit court retains substantial discretion in determining 
the question of admission or exclusion based on prejudice.96 The court also 
stated that because the prosecution did not elicit inflammatory testimony, but 
rather just presented the official adjudication record, whatever prejudice may 
have been created by its admission was not unfair.97 Finally, the court concluded 
its opinion by stating there was significant other evidence presented which 
supported conviction and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion with 
regard to admitting the prior adjudication.98 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Missouri Supreme Court’s holding in Prince represents Missouri’s first 
iteration of a relevancy test regarding the admission of prior acts evidence for 
propensity purposes.99 The test for relevancy hinges on three factors: victim 
similarity, similarity in conduct, and temporal relevance. As stated previously, 
temporal relevance is an analysis weighing the remoteness of prior acts and the 
presence or lack of an intervening event.100 The court relied on Missouri 
common law and precedent from other jurisdictions to formulate this 
framework.101 The court did not, however, lay down a standard for what 
constitutes prejudice which substantially outweighs probative value.102 In fact, 
the court barely addressed the aspect of prejudicial effect, noting only that the 
lack of eliciting inflammatory testimony indicated that the admission of the 
juvenile record was not unfairly prejudicial.103 
As discussed above, prior acts evidence has historically been banned for the 
purpose of showing a defendant’s propensity. This is due to jurors often 
conflating the actual importance of propensity evidence to the instant trial. As 
such, every other jurisdiction allowing for the admission of prior acts evidence 
to prove propensity has done so as an exception to the general bar on propensity 
evidence. As these standards are crafted as exceptions, they are always subject 
to what one might call checks and balances with regard to admission—namely 
a required check on whether or not prejudice outweighs probative value. These 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 821. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 818–21. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 818-21. 
 102. See id. at 821. 
 103. Id. 
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checks are present in either the rule of evidence which allows admission of 
propensity evidence or another rule within each jurisdiction’s rules of 
evidence.104 Here, the language of the Section itself all but creates such a 
check.105 This case and other Missouri precedent on point, however, have 
interpreted the language to grant a wide breadth of discretion rather than 
indicating the need for this check.106 If the legislature intended to grant wide 
discretion, thereby allowing trial courts to weigh prejudice at their own 
discretion, it would not have included the language addressing prejudice in the 
Section at all. Is this really the standard concerning prejudicial effect courts want 
to apply to Missouri’s propensity evidence rule? In order to adequately balance 
the policy concerns of convicting child sex offenders and protecting defendants’ 
rights Missouri courts should not diverge from what other jurisdictions are 
doing, but rather should weigh the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence 
when admitting evidence pursuant to Article I, section 18(c). 
In addition to its failure to fully address prejudice, the court did not consider 
necessity as a factor. The court’s failure to consider necessity exacerbated its 
inadequate consideration of the prejudicial effect of admission of prior acts 
evidence. The necessity factor asks whether or not the prosecution could have 
achieved conviction without the admission of the prior acts evidence. Under the 
Lemay standard, necessity is determined by practicality rather than absolute 
necessity, meaning that it need not be absolutely necessary to obtain conviction, 
but rather practically necessary in light of the evidence already adduced.107 
Thus, the necessity of the evidence with regard to obtaining conviction is 
arguably one of the most important factors in this analysis because it weighs the 
competing policy concerns surrounding admission of prior acts evidence. 
In Prince, the evidence at issue was not necessary to achieve a conviction. 
The Missouri Supreme Court concluded there was ample other evidence to 
support conviction.108 Why then should the juvenile records of a defendant be 
admitted for propensity purposes? If the prosecution did not need the evidence 
to prove their case, then it logically follows the evidence was neither absolutely 
nor practically necessary. Thus, the only real value provided by the admission 
 
 104. FED. R. EVID. 413; ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(ii); ARIZ. R. EVID. 404(c)(1)(C); CAL. 
EVID. CODE § 1108(a); CONN. CODE EVID. 4-5(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2)(b) (West 2019); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-414(a) (West 2019); KAN. STAT. ANN 60-455(d) (West 2019); LA. CODE 
EVID. ANN. ART. 412.2(a); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.27 (West 2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 27-414(3) (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT.12 § 2413 (a) (West 2019); UTAH R. EVID. 404(c). 
 105. See Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18(c) (“The court may exclude relevant evidence of prior criminal 
acts if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair  
prejudice.”). 
 106. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 821; State v. Rucker, 512 S.W.3d 63, 67-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017); 
State v. Jones, 546 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). 
 107. United States v. Lemay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 108. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 821. 
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of the juvenile records was in proving the defendant’s bad character, again one 
of the major policy concerns at the heart of the historical ban on this type of 
evidence. In the absence of necessity, this type of evidence should never have 
been admitted. It was prejudicial to say the least, and to allow admission liberally 
creates a standard that favors admission of evidence over providing a fair trial 
by the defendant’s peers. 
Finally, the Missouri Supreme Court did not address the glaring conflict of 
law seemingly present in this case. Missouri does not allow for the admission of 
child adjudicative records in any case outside of the juvenile justice system.109 
In order to stay on topic, this note will not discuss the historical development of 
the juvenile justice system, nor the policy concerns behind why it is a separate 
system with separate records; however, the relevant Missouri statute provides: 
[A]ll admissions, confessions, and statements by the child to the juvenile officer 
and juvenile court personnel and all evidence given in cases under this chapter, 
as well as all reports and records of the juvenile court, are not lawful or proper 
evidence against the child and shall not be used for any purpose whatsoever in 
any proceeding, civil or criminal, other than proceedings under this chapter.110 
In upholding the circuit court’s decision, the Missouri Supreme Court in Prince 
ignored the conflict of law created between admission of defendant’s juvenile 
record and the above cited statute. Furthermore, the only Missouri precedent 
under which this evidence could have been admitted was cited by the court, but 
not for the purpose of addressing this conflict.111 State v. Doss provides that 
juvenile records for delinquencies which would have amounted to a felony had 
the perpetrator been an adult at the time of delinquency may be admitted during 
the sentencing phase of a trial.112 Here, the records were admitted during the 
guilt phase of the trial,113 clearly circumventing Missouri statutory and common 
law. The only justification for this circumvention is that the Section, as a 
constitutional provision, trumps state statutes and common law. 
If this indeed was the reasoning applicable to the instant case, this creates 
the very real and very dangerous precedent that the Section itself is an 
evidentiary trump card. As Missouri rules of evidence are not codified in the 
traditional sense, but rather are dictated by the combined statutes and case law 
which lay them down,114 case law and statutes which would normally keep 
 
 109. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.271 (West 2019). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 819 (citing State v. Doss, 394 S.W.3d 486, 496–97 (Mo. Ct. App.  
2013)). 
 112. State v. Doss, 394 S.W.3d 486, 496–97 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 113. Prince, 534 S.W.3d at 817. 
 114. Justin M. Dean, Missouri’s Law on Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence: Increasing 
Inclusivity, 64 MO. LAW REV., 187, 192 (1999) (“Missouri’s law of evidence, unlike the federal 
rules of evidence, has not been codified into a formal set of rules to which the courts can look.  
Instead, it has developed through case law and statutes.”). 
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juvenile adjudications out of court are subordinate to Missouri’s constitution, 
and therefore, the Section. Thus, by ignoring the conflict of law, the court failed 
to dictate how the Section will co-exist with other rules of evidence, thereby 
creating an evidentiary trump card pertaining to the most prejudicial type of 
evidence. This, in and of itself, makes Missouri the outlier with regard to 
propensity evidence as every other jurisdiction has inherent checks on 
admissibility present in their rules of evidence. 
Beyond the scope of this Note, but still very relevant, are three additional 
issues. Those issues are: potential Sixth Amendment issues regarding the 
inability of a defendant to confront his accuser when evidence adduced is in 
summary record form; due process issues stemming from the language of the 
Section itself, as it appears to create a presumption of admissibility; and the very 
real concern that the genesis of these types of evidentiary rules is a result of the 
emotionally charged nature of the crime and that conviction rates in these types 
of crimes are traditionally below that of other types of crimes, and as a result 
these rules are crafted to lessen the prosecutor’s burden in such cases. Changes 
like this create precedent for a proverbial Pandora’s Box full of potential rule 
changes based not on constitutional protections, but rather on the thoughts and 
concerns currently relevant in society. 
CONCLUSION 
The Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Prince represents both a 
standard of application and an evidentiary trump card. The three-factor 
relevancy test for admission under Art. I, section 18(c) prescribed in this case 
was in line with what other jurisdictions are doing regarding relevancy. 
However, the court should consider adding a fourth factor: necessity. Adding 
the necessity factor weighs the value created by admission with the policy 
concerns behind its traditional ban, thereby fully evaluating the evidence prior 
to its admission. In addition, the court’s minimal analysis with regard to 
prejudice, and the complete omission of analysis addressing the potential 
conflict between Missouri statute and the evidence admitted in this case created 
potentially dangerous precedent. To all but ignore the prejudicial effect by 
stating the statutory language grants wide discretion to trial courts was directly 
contrary to the policy concerns behind the historical prohibition on propensity 
evidence. Furthermore, it was in direct conflict with the inherent checks on 
prejudicial effect included in every other similar statute or rule of evidence. 
Finally, to ignore the potential conflict of law present in this case seemingly 
creates a standard by which, in the absence of constitutional checks on 
admission, presumes admissibility regardless of other rules of evidence.  
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